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Prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United States and Iran enjoyed a close alliance 
built around almost three decades of American support for Iran’s pro-Western monarch, 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The Shah’s desire for military supremacy over his 
neighbours and his distrust of the Soviets saw him seek a military relationship with the 
United States following the end of the Second World War. This relationship began as a 
minor aid programme in 1950 before undergoing a step change with the Anglo-American 
coup in Iran in 1953 that unseated a left-leaning popularly elected coalition that had 
marginalised the Shah. Following the coup, Iran’s military aid was renewed, upgraded, 
and later supplemented by arms credit purchases in the early 1960s. By 1968 Iran was 
America’s largest single arms customer, purchasing approximately US$150 million of 
arms annually. In 1972, following a meeting in Tehran with President Richard Nixon and 
his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, Iran received a “blank cheque” to purchase 
any arms it desired on favourable credit terms – except for nuclear weapons. Within days 
of the meeting, the Shah embarked on an annual multi-billion dollar arms spending spree 
in Washington, transforming the Iranian-American arms relationship qualitatively and 
quantitatively. That transformation endured until late 1978 when the Shah began to lose 
control of his domestic affairs and indicated to the new president, Jimmy Carter, that he 
would need to delay any further programmes. 
 
As Iranian-American arms sales grew ever grander through the 1970s and the power of 
the executive in the United States reached a nadir following Richard Nixon’s resignation 
over the Watergate scandal, his Republican successor’s, Gerald Ford’s, time in office 
became a pivotal and testing period for Iranian-American relations. However, the relatively 
small amount of dedicated historiography on the Ford period barely mentions Iran at all.1 
On the other hand, studies that address Iran throughout the 1970s often only mention the 
Ford years in passing or omit analysis of the Administration’s two and one- half years in 
office entirely.2 These omissions are in no doubt due to the significance and impact of 
Nixon’s tenure, both in general terms – and in this case, in reference to Iranian-American 
policy.  
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When Nixon came to power in January 1969, he developed a doctrine in response to the 
escalating human and political cost in the Vietnam War. In essence, his doctrine sought 
to transfer the costs of Cold War containment and essentially outsource it. In that sense, 
the Nixon Doctrine’s logic was to encourage certain more capable allies to pay for their 
own defences, rather than rely on direct American force projection and military aid in global 
containment. In Iran’s case, a capable ally willing to pay for its own arms, the Doctrine 
fuelled the thinking behind the blank cheque policy – a policy devolving from meetings 
between Nixon and the Shah of Iran at Tehran in May 1972.3 The Doctrine was a neat fit 
for the Shah thanks to his rising oil revenues and ambitions to establish Iran as a peerless 
power in the Gulf, or as he often referred to it – the Japan of West Asia. Throughout the 
1960s, the Gulf and the wider Middle East had become a major concern for American 
policy-makers. The list of American allies had become scarce due to Washington’s 
growing support for Israel and the volatility of Arab nationalism. When the British 
announced that they were retreating East of Suez and would be withdrawing their military 
forces from of the Gulf by the end of 1971 due to dire economic conditions and 
overstretched commitments overseas, Nixon looked to the Shah to play the major part in 
preventing any post-British vacuum allowing the Soviets to step in. The major arms 
relationship with Iran twinned with a deep economic accord with Saudi Arabia and tentative 
relations with the smaller Powers in the area. Having Iran’s arms sales facilitated in 
America was good for Cold War geopolitics; it fully locked the Shah into the American orbit 
following a brief flirtation with the Soviets over high-level arms purchases in the 1960s, 
and it was good for the American economy. Hence, it was vital for Nixon’s post-1972 plan 
for the Gulf to allow Iran to build up its forces to the level the Shah deemed necessary 
without political interference in Washington – a build up that was only in its first phase 
when Ford took office in August 1974. 
 
Whilst the extant literature has largely missed Iran during the Ford years, much needs 
consideration. Between 1974 and 1976, significant developments in the U.S-Iran arms 
relationship occurred. It is largely a story of continuity from the legacy bestowed by Nixon’s 
blank cheque agreement – but it is also a story of a deepening, and increasingly complex, 
relationship. That deepening presented a series of challenges for the Ford Administration. 
As the various arms developments unfolded during 1974 and 1975, there was a 
noteworthy under-current developing initiated by concerns at the Department of Defense 
and, in Congress, over ever-closer American military entanglement in Iran. Arms sales 
were not just a matter of making a transaction and receiving money in return for the supply 
of goods. The Iranians required training to operate the equipment, some of which was the 
most advanced in the American inventory. As arms sales to Iran spiralled to levels that 
surpassed those with any other Power, there was an understandable tension within the 
Pentagon to ensure that such a large deployment of American equipment – mere miles 
from the Soviet southern border – was safe. Through the same period, Congress had 
begun to express similar concerns, making tentative moves to establish an independent 
position on arming Iran. Both examples eventually combine to offer an insight into the 
challenges that Ford faced regarding arming Iran and yield new insights into the 
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importance of the decisions Ford made on the larger Iranian-American relationship. 
 
The Congressional Challenge 
 
The context in which Ford became president is important. Nixon’s resignation propelled 
Ford into office by virtue of him having already replaced the disgraced Spiro Agnew as 
vice-president. Prior to this, Ford had been a member of the House of Representatives for 
over two decades – eight as Minority Leader. It would be no exaggeration to say that his 
heart was in the Congress, as both he and many others have remarked.4 With Nixon 
removed from power, it appeared that Congress would be more receptive to Ford as a 
former colleague. Ford hoped this would be the case. In his first presidential address to 
Congress on 12 August 1974, he made clear that he wanted to end the antagonism and 
conflict that had marked the relationship between the executive and Congress during the 
Nixon years, proclaiming as his motto  
. . . communication, conciliation, compromise and co-operation. This 
Congress . . . will be my working partner as well as my most constructive 
critic . . . . I do not want a honeymoon with you. I want a good marriage.5 
This hope was quickly shattered by Ford’s controversial pardon of Nixon, which led his 
assistant for legislative affairs, Max Friedersdorf, to comment that the euphoria of Nixon’s 
resignation was “quickly dissipated with the pardon”, adding that “after the pardon I don’t 
think we had a marriage . . . I would say it was an uneasy separation. It certainly was not a 
marriage”.6 
 
Part of Ford’s problem was that the Watergate revelations and the Vietnam War had 
seriously damaged the faith of millions of Americans in the federal government, the 
presidency, and in the constitutional process itself. The balance of power that many 
analysts believed had moved towards “the imperial presidency”7 under the Democrat 
Lyndon Johnson and the Republican Nixon had begun to shift from the executive to the 
legislature as Congress, dominated by Democrats, sought to re-assert its authority in both 
foreign and domestic policy and fill the vacuum created by the ailing Nixon Administration. 
Furthermore, the hopes of the legislative ambitions articulated in John F. Kennedy’s “New 
Frontier” (1961-1963) and Johnson’s “Great Society” (1965-1968) had crumbled as the 
American people faced double-digit inflation, rising unemployment, an energy crisis, a 
plunging stock market, deadlock in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviets, 
and the closing trauma of Vietnam.  
 
Ford was unusually handicapped in facing these difficulties. As an un-elected president, 
he had to tackle these challenges without a national mandate. He had never run for 
national or even state-wide office. In fact, his only electoral experience was as the 
Congressman for the Fifth District of Michigan, which he had represented since 1949. 
Sensing weakness, Congress set upon opposing Ford’s various early economic, domestic 
taxation, and benefits bills – even to the extent of overturning several presidential vetoes 
– an experience that caused Ford deep personal upset.8  Therefore, having Congress 
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prove such a crippling obstacle in virtually every exercise of government was disorienting 
for him.  
 
Ford, however, assumed the presidency “confident that [he] knew as much about foreign 
policy as any member of Congress”.9 He had travelled abroad extensively, served on both 
the House Defense Appropriations Sub-committee, where he became the leading 
Republican expert on the defence budget, and the House Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Sub-committee.  Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s secretary of state and national 
security advisor, or Kissinger’s National Security Council [NSC] deputy, Brent Scowcroft, 
had also briefed him every week during his eight months as vice-president.10 To project 
an image of stability and continuity in foreign affairs at a time of tremendous upheaval, 
Ford retained Kissinger in his two positions. This also reflected his “admiration” for 
Kissinger. “I respected his expertise in foreign policy”, he later wrote. “He was a total 
pragmatist who thought in terms of power and national interest instead of ideology. He 
had a global view of international relationships and tried to rearrange them in a way that 
would be beneficial to the United States”.11  
 
In the early days of his presidency, Ford relied on Kissinger but, as he got to grips with the 
intricacies of international relations and gained in confidence, he occasionally rejected his 
advice. In October 1974, for example, despite Kissinger’s objections, he signed a 
compromise continuing appropriations resolution that required a cut-off of military aid to 
Turkey. 12   More dramatically, they were to come to blows over America’s policy in 
Southeast Asia. Both, however, shared a similar view of Russia’s involvement in the 
Middle East, with Ford convinced that the Soviet Union was seeking “to keep the pot 
boiling in that part of the world”.13 They were all too aware, as was the Shah, that Russia 
had influence in Iraq.  
 
In the dying days of Nixon’s Administration, Congress grew increasingly concerned by the 
rapidly increasing amount of arms sales to Iran. Most notably, Iranian purchasing jumped 
from approximately US$150 million annually in 1971 to a figure around US$3 billion in 
1973. Not surprisingly, Congress was motivated to investigate. A legacy of Nixon in this 
respect was his systematic removal of effective arms sale oversight from Congress to 
facilitate Nixon Doctrine policies. With the imperial presidency now over, a momentum was 
underway in Congress to recover lost influence. 
 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee despatched Senators J. Norvill Jones and 
George W. Ashworth to Tehran in late October 1974 to conduct a report. The senators 
embarked without any prior disclosure to the American Embassy in Tehran as to the exact 
nature of their mission.14 The State Department learnt of the trip on the same day as the 
ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms, via an eleven-point memorandum noting that the 
senators would be conducting a comprehensive investigation of Iranian-American policy. 
It would range from the ability of Iran to absorb sophisticated American equipment, the 
wisdom of the ever-increasing number of American armed personnel and private 
contractors in Iran, and concerns over potentially illegal transfers of American equipment 
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from Iran to other nations such as Oman and Pakistan.15 Helms acted quickly, targeting a 
letter to Democratic Senator Stewart Symington who had led a series of Congressional 
hearings into arms sales in 1967 following the Six Day War and a revisionist on arms 
issues. Going on Symington’s past record, Helms suspected him to be the anti-Iran 
ringleader in the Committee and set about stressing the positive impact that Iranian arms 
sales were having on the troubled American economy. Helms wrote: 
The idea that the United States should beat up on Iran because of high crude oil 
prices is childish and short-sighted. Are we not a capitalist country which depends 
on proceeds from industry to provide the taxes to pay for salaries in the 
Congressional Branch as well as the Executive?16 
Two weeks later, discussing the matter at a meeting in the State Department with 
Scowcroft and James Schlesinger, the secretary of Defense, Kissinger reaffirmed Helms’ 
case: “The Shah is the one guy who has a strategic conception. He is with us on everything 
but oil and there he only wants money – and he could put US$10 billion into the U.S. 
[economy]”.17 Upon returning to Washington, the two senators raised various concerns in 
their draft report that caused the Foreign Relations Committee, spearheaded by the 
Democratic senator, William Fulbright, to press the Ford Administration hard for access to 
classified documents on the landmark 1972 arms sales agreed between the Shah and 
Nixon.18 It included the tentative discussions of the sale of Laser-guided bombs and F-14 
and F-15 fighter jets. 19  Fulbright’s request came on top of a similar request from 
Democratic Congressman Clarence D. Long, who had asked for permission in a letter to 
Kissinger on 16 October 1974 to conduct research on classified material on American 
arms sales to Iran.20 Clearly, there was an appetite on Capitol Hill for information on 
Iranian-American arms sales, information the Administration withheld. Kissinger’s NSC 
staff, together with his deputy secretary at the State Department, Robert S. Ingersoll, 
recommended in mid-December that both Fulbright and Long review such documents, 
with an NSC staff officer made available to explain any queries that the Congressional 
staff raised upon consulting them. 21  Presumably, this would allow for managing the 
situation without rejecting the enquiries wholesale. Kissinger denied this request on 13 
December, noting on a memorandum that he preferred purposefully to stall the issue and 
ignore the requests – hoping that the issue would pass.22 In the internal discussion within 
the NSC, the main areas of sensitivity revolved around the blank cheque on arms sales 
that Nixon had issued to the Shah, detailed explicitly on one of the documents Fulbright 
had requested. As the Administration denied Congress and the public knowledge about 
the blank cheque, speculation had taken hold in lieu of full disclosure of the facts. For that 
reason, Kissinger’s sensitivity was understandable.23  
 
Kissinger’s opposition to Congressional meddling in foreign policy remains well 
documented – something he had regularly voiced publicly throughout 1974 and 1975. In 
a late January 1975 speech, he reaffirmed that Congress was “not well suited to the 
detailed supervision of the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy”.24 Unfortunately for Kissinger, 
the trend was clearly moving toward Congress exercising the full extent of its constitutional 
oversight role, in the spirit of Democratic Senator Frank Church’s idiom that the Congress 
should not conduct foreign policy – but it should actively help in making it.25 Hence, 
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Kissinger’s denial of access to the Iran-arms papers in December 1974 did not end the 
matter. It caused frequent back and forth acrimony throughout the remainder of the Ford 
years as Kissinger continued to fend off further Congressional attempts to access 
classified arms documents.26  
 
In the final days of 1974, Ford faced increasing difficulties with Congress, not least 
because of the fall-out of his controversial pardon of Nixon, heavy Republican loses in the 
mid-term elections, and an economy plummeting into recession. The passing of the 
Foreign Assistance Act highlighted the growing challenges from Congress. The Act 
contained an amendment added by Senator Gaylord Nelson and Representative Jonathan 
Bingham – both Democrats – that mandated that any arms sale in excess of US$25 million 
required Congressional approval.27  Consequently, Congress would receive notification of 
such sales and over a period of 20 days decide to authorise or block the transfer. Blocking 
could only occur by a concurrent resolution from both Houses of Congress. Therefore, if 
one House passed the sale, it would proceed. The Nelson-Bingham amendment would 
have major ramifications for arms policy, and would – if exercised – effectively kill the 
blank cheque policy towards Iran. 
 
Now armed with new powers, Congress continued to seek its own perspective. Another 
team went to Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia on 22 May 1975 to investigate further 
American arms sales. Largely passive, the ensuing report did not recommend any clear 
action – instead lamenting that there appeared to be no discernible policy on arms supplies, 
rather an ad hoc approach that lacked co-ordination and oversight.28 These conclusions 
reaffirmed earlier perceptions by the Congress that it did not understand the exact terms 
with which the Administration was carrying out its arms sales policy towards Iran. One can 
only surmise that Kissinger’s continued denial of co-operation with Congress, principally 
his withholding of the arms documents that had been frequently requested, had limited the 
scope of their understanding. The essential controversy that the Administration was 
attempting to contain was that a foreign leader was essentially conducting arms purchases 
in an unmoderated fashion, with absolutely no safeguards or intervention by American 
governmental agencies – with the exception of sales involving nuclear technology. 29 
Historically this was an aberration in American policy. Yet, it was the centrepiece of the 
unique United States relationship with the Shah – who by 1972 had become the only 
regional ally truly compatible with Nixon Doctrine because, first, he was willing and able 
and, second, not wholly antagonistic to the other regional Powers when viewed in relation 
to Israel, for example. Hence, the Shah had manoeuvred himself into a position where he 
was punching far above his weight due to Cold War geopolitics.  
 
The extent of the secrecy within the executive going back to 1972 had thus far arrested 
the efforts of Congress to come to terms with the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy orientation 
towards Iran and understand why arms sales in this case were so different from those with 
other allies. To that effect, calling the hearings on Capitol Hill that followed through June 
and July 1975 came with the purpose of finally providing Congress with that very 
understanding. During the first series of hearings, the despatch of officials at the deputy 
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and under-secretary levels from the departments of State and Defense occurred to placate 
further the Congress with limited disclosures. 30  Unsatisfied with that testimony, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations bypassed any possibility of lower level Administration 
officials fobbing it off and summoned Kissinger directly as part of a series of further 
hearings.31 Kissinger duly testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 25 
July 1975.  Consuming “considerable time”, discussion of Iran’s potential purchase of the 
cutting edge – and at that time still in development – air surveillance Airborne Warning 
and Control System [AWACS] raised significant questions,.32 Kissinger cabled a message 
to the Shah following his testimony admitting that the new mood on Capitol Hill was making 
for a “difficult situation” – but that the Administration remained steadfast in allowing Iran to 
determine its own defence needs. Kissinger reassured that he “would continue to work 
hard on the matter”.33  
 
The high level of scrutiny within the Congress did not stop the flow of military purchases. 
A comparatively lower-order pair of sales of 222 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and 39 Bell 
utility helicopters totalling US$207 million got approval in August 1975.34 In the following 
three months, further sales of over US$70 million won authorisation, including ground 
radar equipment and a pair of P-3F surveillance aircraft.35 Hence, despite the high level of 
scrutiny, Congress remained outwardly co-operative to the regular flow of arms to Iran, 
not yet wielding its veto power over arms sales packages in excess of US$25 million. 
Absent the full understanding for selling these arms and the deeper arrangements at play, 
Congress had elected – at least for now – to allow a range of non-controversial sales to 
continue rather than risk upsetting an important allied relationship.  
 
The culmination of Kissinger’s actions vis-à-vis Congress would actually manifest some 
time later during the Democrat Jimmy Carter’s first year in the White House in 1977 – 
following his defeat of Ford in the 1976 election. By that point, Congress had grown tired 
of the pattern of affairs and decided to reject a major Iran arms sale that had its roots in 
the Nixon-Ford years. When the Shah eventually placed an order in 1977 for a fleet of 
AWACS radar aircraft, both Houses of Congress rejected the sale and made public the 
extent of their frustration with regular lack of consultation in Iranian-American arms sales. 
Although extensive lobbying by Carter allowed the sale eventually to clear Congress on a 
second reading, the long drawn affair and public hearings demonstrated the level of pent 
up frustration visible on Capitol Hill. For Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the unsuccessful 
Democratic presidential nominee in 1968, a culture had emerged in the executive of 
treating arms sales “as if we were selling televisions and refrigerators and washing 
machines”. 36  To remedy this situation, Congress desired a fuller consultation role in 
examining arms deals before they were agreed and simply rubberstamped. A Republican, 
Senator Clifford P. Case, addressed this problem acutely, using the AWACS sale as an 
example: 
We are not really going to be able to review something if the Shah of Iran has 
already been told he is going to get it 3 or 4 years ago and if he has made all his 
own plans and staked his prestige in part on the promise that he is going to get it. 
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Our relations with Iran are going to suffer if we exercise effectively what the public 
expects us to exercise; namely, a normal oversight function.37 
With all this to mind, it is not surprising that Congress drew a line over arming Iran.  
 
What may be surprising is that it took until 1977 to do so effectively. This delay is no doubt 
due to the effectiveness of Nixon, Ford and especially Kissinger’s deft manoeuvres. 
Additionally, although the evasive tactics and denial of information to Congress had 
allowed progress in the mid-1970s, it did have the longer term effect of destabilising not 
only Iranian-American relations, but also the political fate of the Shah, who began to lose 
his grip on power as domestic opposition hardened through 1977 and 1978. In the words 
of Cyrus Vance, Carter’s secretary of state, when reflecting on the Iran-AWACS-Congress 
debacle: “The effect of this summer-long fight was, perversely, to shake the Shah’s 
confidence in the United States as a dependable ally. He missed the more open access 
to U.S. Military equipment he had enjoyed in the early 1970s, and he resented the public 
criticism”.38 
 
The Schlesinger Challenge 
 
Regular concerns within the Department of Defense over the level of arms sold to Iran had 
surfaced as early as late 1973. They were first evident at the staffer level, before closely 
aligning with the views of the secretary of Defense, Schlesinger. Schlesinger eventually 
commissioned a wide-ranging Department of Defense-led study into Iran arms policies in 
early 1975 – a study never fully consummated during the life of the Administration. 
Schlesinger took the earliest opportunity to summarise its draft findings directly to the 
president in early May 1975 with a cautionary memorandum. He warned that significant 
doubt existed over whether the open-ended military commitment to Iran was in America’s 
best interests due to a growing divergence of American policies and Iranian behaviour.39 
Schlesinger reported that Iran’s defence spending had risen to 15.2 percent of GDP and 
experienced a 15-fold increase in expenditure from 1968 to 1975. With that context in 
mind, Schlesinger set out two major problem areas. First, the “lack of training or even 
trainable Iranian manpower . . . plus delays in the huge construction programs required to 
provide supporting facilities for the weapons and equipment being obtained from 
abroad”.40  Second: 
Frankly, the US itself would find it extremely difficult to handle expansion programs 
of this size and speed; the Iranians cannot do it. The military supply system is a 
shambles. There is no delegation of authority, military pay and housing lags behind 
the civil sector, incompetence and corruption are endemic, and there is no prospect 
that the Iranian forces will be in respectable fighting shape for years to come.  
American personnel deployed in Iran, both military and civilians – the latter 
comprised of large numbers of ex-American forces – was to grow to 17,000 in 1976, a rise 
of over 40 percent from 1975 levels. The study predicted that numbers would rise to 
76,000 in 1980 – a number that would pose “a significant drain” on American military and 
technical resources.41 The outlook for Iranian-American relations in the second half of the 
1970s was hence – according to Schlesinger – not the rosy picture envisioned by Kissinger 
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and Nixon earlier in the decade; and there was a very real possibility that Nixon’s blank 
cheque would need re-thinking due to Congressional pressures. Schlesinger requested 
using his appraisal of the Iran situation as the basis for a National Security Study 
Memorandum [NSSM] on Iran to envision better the challenges laying ahead. Two weeks 
later, Kissinger responded by initiating NSSM 223, calling for a long-term review of the 
logic and purpose of American policy on arms transfers in general, not a detailed study of 
Iranian-American arms policy.42 In that sense, Kissinger’s control over the policy process 
allowed him to redirect and dilute Schlesinger’s concerns to insulate Iran and the 
agreements made in May 1972 – of which Kissinger remained a steadfast advocate. 
 
Schlesinger’s position on Iran seemed at odds with his established reputation as a relative 
hawk who advocated enhanced American military power and a harder line on détente with 
the Soviet Union.43 The latter was vocalised via the so-called “Schlesinger doctrine” that 
recommended a deepened and expanded American nuclear deterrence posture to 
facilitate a more substantial commitment to American allies in sensitive areas, particularly 
Europe.44 Further, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Schlesinger had supported the 
American airlifts of arms to Israel because it demonstrated that the Untied States did not 
intend to abandon its allies in the Middle East.45 Adding a further layer of mysteriousness 
into Schlesinger’s Iran-arms warning, the draft report on Iran to which he had referred in 
May was somewhat different in its conclusions than he had presented to Ford – as 
evidenced with its publication in full on 5 August 1975. The study actually concluded that 
continuing the military relationship with Iran was important, with no major changes 
advisable beyond a revision of “certain practical problems” that could be remedied by 
better implementation, oversight, and planning by both the American military and Iran.46 
Hence, Schlesinger had pre-emptively politicised the report in an attempt to influence Ford, 
counter Kissinger’s steadfast pro-Shah advocacy, and attempt to introduce some 
moderation into Iran arms policy.   
 
Despite his larger strategic concerns, Schlesinger’s position on Iran was actually a 
constant. From the outset of his tenure at the Pentagon in July 1973, he had expressed 
disquiet at the American arms relationship with the Shah, an impression that only 
deepened following each of several meetings he had held with the Shah during 1973-1975. 
Although always lending Iran “a sympathetic ear”, to quote the Shah, 47  Schlesinger 
believed that the extent of the arms relationship was irresponsible, disproportionate, and 
would erode the international prestige of the Department of Defense as a reliable military 
partner.48 Acting on his concerns, Schlesinger despatched a former colleague and retired 
Army colonel, Richard Hallock, to Tehran in September 1973 to act as his unofficial eyes 
on the ground. Much to Schlesinger’s disapproval, Hallock simultaneously accepted a 
multi-million-dollar consultancy contract with the Shah. This placed Hallock in a position 
in which he was essentially advocating for the Shah on military matters whilst also working 
as an independent advisor for the Pentagon. Worse still, Hallock was also consulting for 
various arms suppliers.49 As a result, Schlesinger did not get the independent advice he 
had anticipated as Hallock essentially joined the burgeoning pro-Iran arms camp in Tehran 
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and, in doing so, used his inside knowledge of the American military procurement system 
to bargain for millions of dollars worth of discounts for the Shah’s prospective purchases.50  
 
Hallock supplemented his own advisory role by assisting the Iranians by bringing in a 
greater number of independent military experts; this balanced against the official 
Pentagon-staffed American Military Affairs Advisory Group. General Hassan Toufanian, 
the longstanding Iranian vice-minister of War for Armaments, later described Hallock as 
“a force at the Pentagon resembling Oliver North in the [Ronald Reagan] White House in 
later years”. 51  Whilst the Iranians were understandably very happy with Hallock, the 
Defense Department’s Criminal Division dismissed him in mid-1975, which raised the 
alarm of the Congress that investigated Hallock the following year.52  
 
The Hallock affair was but the latest in a familiar pattern of American diplomats, advisers, 
politicians, and officials arriving in Iran and quickly succumbing to “Tehranitis”, best 
described as an affliction that struck those present with a noticeably unbalanced pro-Shah 
disposition. The cause of this strange affliction may have been personal political gain, the 
distortion effect caused by Cold War geopolitics, greed, infatuation, or awe for the Shah’s 
personality and grand designs – or a blend of any of the aforementioned. Successive 
American ambassadors to Iran exhibited strong signs of the affliction. Armin Meyer and 
Douglas MacArthur established the trend through the mid-late 1960s and early 1970s, 
becoming consistent advocates for the Shah and his arms ambitions during their time in 
Tehran. Richard Helms became the most vocal pro-Shah ambassador of all, taking his 
cues from the Nixon-Kissinger encounter in Tehran in May 1972, which effectively 
established Tehranitis as American national policy through the highly unusual military 
relationship it initiated. The concept of Tehranitis appears as the sharper edge of what 
James A. Bill dubbed “Pahlavism”, which accounts for a four-decade long series of 
personal and political ties between the Shah, his regime, and American political and 
business elites.53 
 
Whilst Schlesinger, a senior Administration figure notable for his lack of Tehranitis, had 
succeeded in opening up a review of American arms policies, completing NSSM 223 did 
not occur until 4 June 1976, almost one year behind schedule. The glacial pace was a 
product of Kissinger’s deft manoeuvring, ensuring that the relationship with Shah – which 
had his unwavering personal advocacy – was not interrupted.54 In the interim, much had 
changed in the Administration. Schlesinger had become increasingly adversarial with 
Kissinger;55 he also had never been popular with Ford, uncomfortable with Schlesinger’s 
professorial, often arrogant, personality and the disruption his rivalry with Kissinger caused 
within the Administration.56 Suggesting that Schlesinger often failed to carry out Ford’s 
orders. James Cannon observed, “As time went on, Ford’s resentment grew; he counted 
the occasions when Schlesinger had been insubordinate”. Ford would admit to Cannon, 
“It came to me one day. I had gotten fed up with the conflict between Schlesinger and 
Kissinger. Their continuous bickering and disagreement disrupted the way I thought 
defense and foreign policy ought to operate together”.57 As Ford described to Kissinger,  
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Jim’s fight is not with you but with me. He thinks I am stupid, and he believes you 
are running me, which he resents. This conflict will not end until I either fire Jim or 
make him believe he is running me.58 
Ford eventually fired Schlesinger and replaced him with his trusted aide and close 
friend, Donald Rumsfeld, who was previously Ford’s chief of staff and American 
ambassador to NATO. In turn, Rumsfeld’s protégé, Dick Cheney, replaced him as chief of 
staff. At the same time, Ford promoted Scowcroft as national security advisor rather than 
have him continue to deputise for Kissinger, who remained secretary of state. The 
reshuffle was an attempt by Ford to put his own stamp on his foreign policy machine and, 
in Scowcroft’s case, deflect persistent accusations that Kissinger’s power had become 
excessive.59 In reality, Kissinger retained his influence in the White House and his mastery 
over the exercise of foreign policy, relying on Scowcroft as a trusted ally who ran the NSC 
as a co-ordination mechanism, rather than as a proactive policy entrepreneur as it had 
been during Kissinger’s tenure.60 
 
Continuity in a Testing Climate 
 
When NSSM 223 did finally arrive, it set out a Department of Defense position that did not 
reflect Schlesinger’s alarmism and had evolved yet further from the August 1975 study on 
Iran. Whilst addressing Iran’s arms absorption and integration problems, mention of Iran 
was infrequent due to Kissinger’s re-focusing of the study to be broad rather than particular. 
With that factor in mind, it is fair to assume that the general recommendations made in 
NSSM 223 represented the desired state of affairs with Iran as America’s largest arms 
customer. Although it would be inaccurate to accuse Rumsfeld of being prey to Tehranitis, 
he did not share Schlesinger’s alarmism either. Rumsfeld led the Department of Defense 
to conclude in its report for NSSM 223 that the case for a policy change on arms was 
“exaggerated”.61 Instead, the Department advocated for what it called a “tuning” of existing 
processes to incorporate clearer guidelines for sales and a more active inter-departmental 
oversight of arms transfers.62 There is a peppering of discrepancies in the extant literature 
over this issue. It occurs with an often-held assumption – based solely upon observational 
accounts – that Rumsfeld maintained Schlesinger’s concerns, reflected by a consensus 
within the Department of Defense.63 Whilst this may be true in the sense that the problems 
in Iran did not blinker the Pentagon, the results of NSSM 223 speak clearly enough to 
render these judgments inaccurate.  
 
The real lingering voice for caution in the Pentagon following Schlesinger’s departure was 
the deputy secretary, Robert Ellsworth, ironically appointed by Rumsfeld. In February 
1976, Ellsworth had petitioned a gamut of senior defence-oriented Administration officials, 
“It is absolutely essential that Iranian requests, and the scope and character of our own 
potential involvement, be rigorously examined to insure that we and the Iranians both 
understand the ramifications of any given case or project”.64  He continued, “In today’s 
environment it is all the more important that DOD consideration of Iranian requests be 
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most thorough and that we avoid any advocacy role on the part of U.S. officials associated 
with Iranian programs”. 
 
Ellsworth’s efforts earned him the accusation, through Kissinger, of being part of a 
“viciously anti-Iranian” cabal. That cabal also featured the Treasury secretary, William 
Simon, who had built a reputation of speaking out publicly and privately against the Shah 
due to Tehran’s aggressive oil price policies that culminated in the quadrupling of 
petroleum prices during the oil shocks of 1973-1974.65 The Shah needed enhanced oil 
revenues for his arms purchases. Therefore, in a way – although perhaps perverse when 
factoring in the effects on the American economy – Nixon had instructed Simon and others 
like him not to question the Shah’s motives in public. Nixon and Kissinger both felt, 
privately, that the price increases were inevitable and that the security relationship with 
the Shah was more important in the long run.66 In the end, regarding the Department of 
Defense saga in this issue, Kissinger’s influence over Ford was sufficient to impress upon 
the president the importance of maintaining the status quo with Iran due to its centrality in 
the Administration’s Gulf policy package of outsourcing containment by means of arms 
sales. In turn, Ford made it at least implicitly clear to Rumsfeld on several occasions, and 
explicitly on at least one occasion, the emphasis he would like the Department of Defense 
to stress on Iran, which mirrored that of Kissinger.67  
 
Whilst Rumsfeld was able to quell Ellsworth, the State Department and the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] made a case with NSSM 223 that arms policies in 
certain cases needed clear changes to reflect the need for increased caution in military 
sales. The positions advocated were far short of any dramatic change in policy and 
represented a desire for more oversight rather than a serious re-think. Both agencies 
pushed for the creation of a new board representing each department and agency involved 
in arms transfers. It would become complete with a supporting co-ordinating group to 
institutionalise both the exercise and the subsequent oversight of all arms transfers – 
including commercial sales and co-production agreements.68  
 
Despite the calls from the State Department and the ACDA for change beyond “tuning”, 
the NSSM study inspired no great Administration attention. It lingered in “bureaucratic 
limbo” as the presidential election campaign gathered pace in mid-1976.69 In that sense, 
Kissinger’s delaying and re-focusing of the study, together with his persuasiveness in 
conversation with Ford, succeeded in taking the issue of revising Iran-arms policy off the 
agenda. It occurred despite the outwardly confusing result of Kissinger’s State Department 
actually advocating for a structural change in policy of sorts. In that sense, inferences are 
possible that the recommendations were general, not specific to Iran – Kissinger, with 
Ford’s support, would have acted to exempt or privilege Iran from any such inter-
departmental oversight if the consolidating the study into a corresponding policy 
pronouncement. Yet, it never happened.  
 
Ford’s personal approval – on Kissinger and Rumsfeld’s recommendation – that Iran be 
permitted a US$3.8 billion purchase contract for 160 F-16 fighters in September 1976 
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serves as clear confirmation of the president’s disposition.70 The F-16s were gradually to 
replace the Shah’s ageing F-4 and F-5 fleets. Ford’s approval for the large purchase 
assuredly would raise a red flag on Capitol Hill. In March 1976, Congress had exercised 
its new statutory powers to hold up a comparatively minor sale of C-130 transport aircraft 
to Egypt. This action subsequently raised alarm in Tehran that Iran might be next in the 
Congressional firing line.71 By summer 1976, it had become apparent to Kissinger that 
there was a clear “anti-arms-sales binge on the Hill”.72 Not just Congressional concern 
over arms sales that had been building since 1973 drove this sentiment. Inaccurate 
reporting in the American press sparked Congressional alarm over a new US$10 billion 
arms agreement with Iran, as part of a larger US$50 billion commercial deal.73 The US$10 
billion figure was actually largely comprised of credit re-payments, due over the coming 
five years; hence, it was for deals already done, such as Iran’s purchase of 80 F-14 jets. 
The remaining US$40 billion was largely accountable to an as-yet unsigned and 
contentious Iranian-American commercial nuclear energy deal, which was undergoing 
protracted negotiations due to enhanced non-proliferation concerns in the United States 
following India’s nuclear test in 1973.  It stalled progress here – and with various other 
formative arms deals and infrastructure projects.74 The nature of the media rumours sent 
the Shah into a fit of paranoia that certain interests, including Israel, were lobbying against 
Iran in Washington and leaking false information.75  
 
With high sensitivity in mind, the official Congressional notification of the F-16 sale became 
re-scheduled from August to late September so that deliberations would not be possible 
until early 1977 due to Congress adjourning for the election season. It was a Kissinger-
backed scheme. The hope was that the Congress might be more favourable post-election 
should the results strengthen the position of Ford and/or the Republican Party.76 With 
US$570 million in additional sales to Iran of spare parts, artillery, ammunition, and missiles 
already being prepared to send to Congress before the cut-off date, adding the F-16 would 
diminish the likelihood of those comparatively small sales successfully clearing any 
scrutiny.77  
 
A media offensive by the Shah amplified news of the F-16 sale in late 1976 in which he 
gave numerous interviews and speeches regarding his military plans. Both Houses of 
Congress sought to utilise what remaining time was available before the November 
election to debate the implications of the sale. The Shah’s public admission that an initial 
sale of 160 F-16s would follow with a large F-18 order and 140 more F-16s quickly over-
shadowed the debate. The background to this situation reflected a time of high strain over 
arms sales between the Congress and the Ford Administration. In a 16 September hearing 
of the Sub-committee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Humphrey delivered an angry riposte toward the Executive: “Today I regret to 
report that the performance of the Departments of Defense and State in responding to our 
requests for information during this crucial period has been deplorable”.78  The problem 
was an old one: Kissinger’s continued refusal to authorise the release of various arms 
documents that the Congress had requested. Humphrey noted that the material 
begrudgingly sent was “of a highly superficial nature and cannot be regarded as a serious 
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response to the committee’s inquiries”, before adding; “the requests cannot be pushed 
aside, voided. That day is over”.79  
 
Setting Kissinger’s manoeuvres aside, two underlying problems with the current state of 
affairs stirred Congressional frustrations.  The first involved what Humphrey described as 
that culture of treating arms sales as a trivial matter rather than one with serious 
ramifications. Second, a thinly-veiled Administration desire to neuter the effectiveness of 
Congressional oversight on arms had led to abuse of the process in the form of not only 
withholding requests for documents, but also through the dumping of multiple arms sales 
all at once. Forty such arms sale notifications totalling US$6 billion went to the Congress 
for approval in the first days of September 1976 alone. It was impossible for Congress to 
assess these properly; hence, as the Ford Administration entered its twilight, there was a 
sense that the story of increasing Congressional oversight respecting arms sales had not 
yet reached its end. 
 
Congress was not the only place where frustration with Iran’s F-16 purchase was evident. 
There was also a basic uncertainty over the actual cost of the deal, which caused further 
stalling throughout September. In an exploratory meeting with the Shah in summer 1976, 
General Dynamics – the manufacturer of the F-16 – had estimated that the 300 F-16s that 
the Shah required would cost Iran US$2.14 billion. Yet, by the time that the Pentagon had 
formally assessed and costed the programme under the Foreign Military Sales credit 
framework, the price had spiralled to US$3.8 billion for just 160 jets. Finding the underlying 
cause of the “muddle”, NSC staffer Clinton E. Granger sought answers from the Pentagon. 
He then explained to Scowcroft that the original estimate by General Dynamics did not 
take into account start up costs, spares, support, inflation, and infrastructure costs. 
Additionally, it contained various other “erroneous assumptions” that did not account for 
modifications and variables that the sale would necessitate – such as the alteration of 
certain classified technology that needing removal from export models. 80  Scowcroft 
returned Clifford’s memorandum with the annotated header: “Incredible! And 
unacceptable”, before adding in a further annotation, “how can this be?”81  
 
Reacting to an essentially three-fold increase in the original price of the F-16, the Shah 
was understandably mystified. Additionally, he received evidence from an unnamed British 
source who claimed that the price rises were a deliberate Pentagon strategy to overcharge 
Iran, as Asadollah Alam, a minister at the royal court, paraphrased, “appropriate what little 
remains of our oil revenue”.82 Alam’s comment was related to the fact that the Shah’s 
original plan was to part-pay for the F-16 with an oil barter agreement – an idea that had 
been on the table for over a year in one capacity or another. Broad opposition to the oil-
barter was already in place across the Administration. An NSC memorandum condensed 
opposition from the Council of Economic Advisers, the departments of Defense and State, 
and the Office of Management and Budget for Kissinger when the pitching the idea to the 
Shah in 1975: 
For 500,000 barrels of oil per day out of our total consumption of roughly 
18,000,000 bpd you are, in short, running a major policy and personal risk by 
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advocating this proposal. The profound changes called for in the way the US does 
business and conducts its financial relations holds virtually no hope that the plan 
could succeed and will expose you to the worst sort of criticism.83 
The oil for arms deal remained frustratingly out of reach in Washington, despite 
strong advocacy from Kissinger, due to the same co-ordination and implementation 
difficulties pointed out when first raising the idea.84 Inflation and rises in development and 
manufacturing costs had already led to over US$1 billion in price increases of other 
equipment that Iran had previously commissioned.85 Such occurrences were part of the 
procurement process and were somewhat built into contracts. Yet, the Shah did have a 
legitimate concern that increases were beginning to spiral beyond mutually accepted 
projections. Scowcroft had previously raised the issue of the unacceptability over the lack 
of Pentagon influence over producer price increases in November 1975. At that time, he 
had suggested that Rumsfeld devise a system to anticipate future price problems and 
communicate those clearly to the Shah, thereby reducing friction when prices did go up.86 
Clearly, this system was not yet working satisfactorily.  
 
By mid-September 1976, the signs were clear that although the Administration was 
apologetic over the F-16 price discrepancy, the final price was accurate. With no other 
option short of scrapping the deal, the Shah’s overriding desire to complete the next phase 
of his grand military strategy led him to accept a credit purchase for the full revised US$3.8 
billion F-16 deal on 13 September. 87  The Shah quickly dashed any inkling that the 
threefold increase in cost would lead to some future restraint; he ordered 140 more F-16s 
on 1 October, making up his original figure of 300 – all of which would have to be passed 
through the Congress and rubber stamped by whichever candidate won the presidential 
election.88 On the same day, he also formally requested 250 F-18Ls, with a provisional 
price for that deal alone in the region of US$5-6 billion.89 The F-18L was a multi-role fighter 
jet adapted for land use under development for export customers only. It was derived from 
the Navy’s F-18 programme that had been developed as a more substantial alternative to 
the F-16 lightweight fighter, which the Navy had regarded as insufficient for its needs. 
Once again, the Shah envisioned payment for the F-18L in long term oil barter 
arrangements – an idea he seemed persistent in raising from the dead, despite such an 
arrangement remaining highly unlikely as Scowcroft reaffirmed in late October.90  
 
When adding the multiple hundreds of F-16s and F-18Ls to the 80 F-14s the Shah had 
already purchased – should those additional sales go ahead – the Shah was in the process 
of appropriating one of the most advanced air forces in the world in just a few short years. 
The fact that these deals remained pending due to the 1976 presidential election is beside 
the point. The climate for multi-billion dollar annual arms sales was still in place throughout 
the Ford years – in spite of the various obstacles. That the Shah felt he could confidently 
advance plans for the next step in his military revolution is testimony to this fact.  
 
Conclusion 
 
ISSN: 0959-2296 (Print) 1557-301X (Online) DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2016.1196074  
 16 
When Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a 
momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break, continuing the policy 
of his predecessor.  Rumsfeld’s appointment as secretary of Defense was the tokenistic 
end of what had essentially been a small Iran-arms revisionist cabal in the Ford 
Administration led by Schlesinger, sacked by Ford, Simon, marginalised by Nixon and 
Kissinger, and Ellsworth, overruled by Rumsfeld. The American approach to Iran 
formulated by Nixon and consummated following the 1972 meeting in Tehran by this point 
transcended Nixon, overcame resistance in Washington, and for better or worse had 
become received wisdom in American foreign policy. Ford maintained executive primacy 
over arms sales despite the rise in Congressional power watermarked by the twin peaks 
of Nixon’s resignation and passage of the Nelson-Bingham amendment. A culture of 
secrecy by the executive met exploratory Congressional enquiries into the abnormally 
large volume of arms sales to Iran, which served to dilute Congressional effectiveness. 
The result was a Congress systematically excluded from playing a role in Iranian-American 
arms sales policy. And arms sales with Iran continued apace.  
 
From the beginning of the arms relationship with the United States in the 1950s, when Iran 
was a low order military aid recipient, the Shah had understood that executive advocacy 
was the most effective means of achieving his arms needs. Whilst the general climate was 
building up to a change through the mid-1970s, that assessment remained accurate 
throughout the Ford years. Although Ford’s authority would be consistently challenged by 
a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority in the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature, ultimately the need to support allies in the Middle East 
against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount. 
As such, continuing major arms sales to Iran seemed perfectly logical to the Administration, 
despite the misgivings of a small minority. The policy continued under Carter until the 
revolution of 1979 ended any influence America might have in Iran.  
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